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Abstract: This article provides an exploratory systematic mapping of the global ecosystem of 
COVID-19 pandemic response apps. After considering policy updates by Google Play’s and Apple’s 
App Store, we analyse all the available response apps in July 2020; their different response types; 
the apps’ developers and geographical distribution; the ecosystem’s ‘generativity’ and developers’ 
responsiveness during the unfolding pandemic; the apps’ discursive positioning; and material 
conditions of their development. Google and Apple are gatekeepers of these app ecosystems and 
exercise control on different layers, shaping the pandemic app response as well as the 
relationships between governments, citizens, and other actors. We suggest that this global 
ecosystem of pandemic responses reflects an exceptional mode of what we call ‘pandemic platform 





On 11 March 2020, the World Health Organisation (WHO) officially declared the 
coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak as a global pandemic. By definition, a pandemic 
signals an ‘out of control’ contagion that threatens an entire population and im-
plies a shift away from containment strategies towards extraordinary governance 
conditions (French et al., 2018). The WHO further stated: ‘it’s a crisis that will 
touch every sector, so every sector and every individual must be involved in the 
fight’ (WHO, 2020a, p. 3). Given the central role of platforms and apps in everyday 
life (van Dijck et al., 2018; Morris and Murray, 2018), this call to action would also 
necessarily involve working with big tech companies. Almost immediately, howev-
er, concerns were raised by civil society organisations and academic researchers 
about the development of apps to intervene in the COVID-19 crisis. These included 
risks for civil liberties regarding their potentially excessive surveillance capacities 
to doubts regarding their actual effectiveness particularly for digital contact-trac-
ing, among other concerns (Ada Lovelace Institute 2020; Kitchin, 2020; Privacy In-
ternational, 2020). For major platform companies such as Google and Apple, there-
fore, getting ‘involved in the fight’ would include making carefully negotiated deci-
sions about how to regulate their emerging COVID-19 app ecosystems, and how to 
balance the concerns and priorities of multiple stakeholders. 
Critical questions regarding how platforms govern stem in part from a recognition 
that as intermediating or multi-sided techno-economic systems, platform compa-
nies like Apple and Google have begun to resemble political actors by utilising a 
layering of interrelated yet distinct mechanisms to control and exploit innovation 
(van Dijck et al., 2018; Klonick, 2017; Suzor, 2018). Platforms like app stores, for 
instance, use both technical and legal regulatory means to govern their relation-
ship with third-party software developers, end-users, and other stakeholders 
(Eaton et al., 2011; Gillespie, 2015; Greene and Shilton, 2018; Tiwana et al., 2010), 
while navigating ‘external’ legal frameworks from national and supranational insti-
tutions (Gorwa, 2019). Moreover, from the perspective of a public policy platform, 
corporations are also increasingly understood as political actors beyond strictly 
the terms of market power since they have become powerful gatekeepers of soci-
etal infrastructure that requires new forms of regulatory engagement (Khan, 2018; 
Klonick, 2017; Suzor, 2018). This is especially the case due to their entanglement 
with public communication, education, and healthcare, among other domains. In-
deed, as a recent European Commission report on platform power observes, ‘the 
COVID-19 crisis has made the societal and infrastructural role taken up by plat-
forms even more apparent’ (Busch et al., 2021, p. 4). 
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The exceptional conditions of the pandemic have produced equally exceptional re-
sponses from platform companies concerning the development of COVID-19 apps. 
Their interventions have, accordingly, shaped the complex and dynamic relations 
between software developers, users, and governments during the crisis. This arti-
cle presents an exploratory systematic empirical analysis of this COVID-19 app 
ecosystem and draws attention to how layered platform governance and power re-
lations have mediated the app response to the pandemic as a singular global 
emergency.We use the term ‘ecosystem’ to refer to a platform and the collection of 
(mobile) apps connected to it (Tiwana et al., 2010). Both the Android and iOS mo-
bile platforms technically produce distinct COVID-19 app ecosystems with their 
own apps, despite being organisationally interconnected since many developers 
produce apps for both Android and iOS. 
The numerous socio-political risks and issues identified with COVID-19 apps sug-
gest an obvious need for critical observation of this domain of platform activity 
(Rieder and Hofmann, 2020). Rapid research outputs have assessed how the pow-
erful global technology sector ‘mobilised to seize the opportunity’ and how the 
pandemic ‘has reshaped how social, economic, and political power is created, ex-
erted, and extended through technology’ (Taylor et al., 2020). Critical commenta-
tors, moreover, have drawn attention to how specific protocological interventions 
by platform companies, such as the development of the GAEN (Google/Apple Ex-
posure Notification) system, demonstrated the significant asymmetries between 
national governments and platform companies controlling these processes (Veale, 
2020). Likewise, Milan et al. have explored the ‘technological reconfigurations in 
the datafied pandemic’ from the perspective of underrepresented communities 
(2020). Efforts to broadly map, document and categorise COVID-19 apps, mean-
while, have mainly originated from computer science with an interest in security 
and cryptography (Ahmed et al., 2020; Levy and Stewart, 2021; Samhi et al., 2020; 
Wang et al., 2020) or from public health research aiming to evaluate apps accord-
ing to policy-related frameworks (Davalbhakta et al., 2020; Gasser et al., 2020). 
Other scoping studies have been conducted by the European Commission (Tsinara-
ki et al., 2020), yet such research has not systematically analysed platforms and 
app stores’ mediating role as socio-technical innovation and control (Eaton et al., 
2011). Albright’s study is notable by stressing how ‘hundreds of public health 
agencies and government communication channels simultaneously collapsed their 
efforts into exactly two tightly controlled commercial marketplaces: Apple’s iOS 
and Google’s Play stores’ (2020, n.p.). However, a comprehensive empirical analysis 
of the specific ways that platform governance has played out in the emergence of 
COVID-19 apps has largely been missing. 
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Drawing from multi-situated app studies (Dieter et al., 2019), we address this gap 
by empirically mapping COVID-19 apps across Google’s Play store and Apple’s App 
Store ecosystems. By analysing apps in multiple infrastructural situations, more-
over, we draw attention to how platform governance is layered across different di-
mensions. Specifically, this includes: the algorithmic sorting of COVID-19 apps; the 
kinds of actors involved in app development; the types of app responses; the geo-
graphic distribution of the apps; the responsivity of their development (i.e., how 
quickly apps are released or updated); how developers frame their apps and ad-
dress their users; and the technical composition of the apps themselves. While we 
recognise the above mentioned importance of the GAEN protocol used to facilitate 
digital contract-tracing through mobile apps, it is not included in this study be-
cause it had not yet been widely implemented at the time of this analysis. 1 Simi-
larly, while access to mobile device sensors (e.g. GPS sensors, Bluetooth adapters, 
etc.) is governed and controlled on the level of Google and Apple’s mobile operat-
ing systems (i.e. on the level of Android and iOS) as well as through app permis-
sions requested from users, this study focused primarily on the governance by app 
stores. 2 Finally, we offer an assessment of our findings across these layers con-
cerning key themes in discussions of platform governance, particularly around the 
dominance and public legitimacy of platforms as private governors, and suggest 
some implications for policy considerations that stem from the eventfulness of 
global crisis-driven platform interventions. 
App stores’ responses to the COVID-19 pandemic 
On 14 March 2020, three days after the initial pandemic declaration, Apple an-
nounced significant restrictive changes to its App Store policies. Apple would now 
evaluate all apps developed for the coronavirus disease with a heightened degree 
of attention. Reiterating their mantra of the App Store as ‘a safe and trusted space’, 
Apple affirmed a commitment ‘to ensure data sources are reputable’ as ‘Communi-
ties around the world are depending on apps to be credible news sources’ (Apple 
Developer, 2020a, n.p.). This would mean only accepting authoritative apps ‘from 
recognized entities such as government organisations, health-focused NGOs, com-
panies deeply credentialed in health issues, and medical or educational institu-
tions’ (Apple Developer, 2020a, n.p.). For Apple, this also meant that ‘Entertain-
1. While the Google-Apple Exposure Notification (GAEN) protocols were introduced on 20 May 2020, 
we found that only 8 out of the 410 Android apps in our source set included (GAEN) API in their An-
droidManifest.xml file by November. 
2. While not discussed in this article, the collected data and information about the permissions re-
quested by each app is openly available in the Open Science Framework (OSF). 
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ment or game apps with COVID-19 as their theme will not be allowed’ (Apple De-
veloper, 2020a, n.p.). On the same day, Google published an editorial campaign 
page on Google Play titled ‘Coronavirus: Stay Informed’ with a list of recommended 
apps for being ‘informed and prepared’ about coronavirus, including apps from or-
ganisations like Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), American Red 
Cross, News360, the WHO, and Twitter (Google Play, 2020, n.p.). Shortly before this 
‘Stay Informed’ campaign, Google/Alphabet CEO Sundar Pichai had outlined mea-
sures in place across their range of services to deal with the unique challenges of 
the crisis, stressing that Google Play’s policies already would prohibit app develop-
ers from ‘capitalizing on sensitive events’ and restrict the distribution of medical or 
health-related apps that are ‘misleading or potentially harmful’ (Pichai, 2020, n.p.). 
As the pandemic spread and intensified throughout the year, both companies con-
tinued to update their editorial and policy positions for managing COVID-19 apps, 
while elaborating a set of regulatory mechanisms, and developing new standards 
and techniques to control what had become an exceptional niche of software de-
velopment activity. In May 2020, Google Play released its official developer guide-
lines for COVID-19 apps. In addition to setting Google up as an information match-
maker, ‘connecting users to authoritative information and services’, Google outlined 
economic limits on COVID-19 apps – that is, any apps that meet their eligibility re-
quirements (Google Help, 2020b) – noting they could ‘not contain any monetisa-
tion mechanisms such as ads, in-app products, or in-app donations’ (Tolomei, 2020, 
n.p.). Similarly, it restricted content that contained ‘conspiracy theories, misleading 
claims, “miracle cures” or dangerous treatments, or any patently false or unverifi-
able information’ (Google Help, 2020b, n.p.). In an update to their App Store Re-
view Guidelines, meanwhile, Apple required that apps providing services ‘in high-
ly-regulated fields’, such as healthcare, should be submitted by a legal entity that 
provides the services, and not by an individual developer’ and that medical apps 
‘must clearly disclose data and methodology to support accuracy claims relating to 
health measurements’, as well as new policies for collecting health-related data 
(Apple Developer, 2020b, n.p.). To ensure this, Apple claims that ‘every app is re-
viewed by experts’ based on its App Store Review Guidelines (Apple Developer, 
2020b, n.p.). Both stores also added new pandemic-related requirements to their 
general app store policies (e.g., around health and medical advice) and expedited 
the app review process so that COVID-19 apps could be approved more quickly 
(Google Help, 2020a, n.p.; Google Help, 2020b, n.p.; Tolomei, 2020, n.p.). 
Such policy changes indicated a suspension of ‘business-as-usual’ for COVID-19 
apps, as particular mechanisms around competition and monetisation – typically 
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central to the app economy – were altered by the platform companies to support 
the emergence of a unique space of software development. Moreover, these policy 
changes are also implemented through different layers of technical agency, from 
unique modes of algorithmic curation (i.e., Google’s editorial filter) to new proto-
cols for developers (e.g., GAEN). In this respect, they signal broader changes that 
ultimately extend throughout the platform infrastructure. In what follows, we map 
how these layered changes initiate a form of pandemic platform governance that 
unfolds through an interplay between a platform’s affordances for app develop-
ment, the emergence of app ecosystems around platforms, and the platform’s reg-
ulatory mechanisms, which together simultaneously enable generativity and con-
trol (Eaton et al., 2011; Tiwana et al., 2010). That is, these governance mecha-
nisms become central to the creation, evolution, and regulation of the COVID-19 
app ecosystems that have emerged around Google’s Android and Apple’s iOS mo-
bile platforms. In turn, they support the efforts of a heterogeneous network of 
third-party actors that aim to intervene in and manage the unfolding pandemic as 
a crisis – whether or not these aims were ultimately achieved. 
Demarcating pandemic app ecosystems 
Since app stores are the primary environments for distributing mobile apps, we 
can use them to locate, demarcate, and characterise collections of mobile apps (Di-
eter et al., 2019). Our research focused on the two most popular app stores world-
wide, Google Play for Android apps and Apple’s App Store for iOS apps, 3 and 
queried their supported countries and locations for [COVID-19]-related search 
terms. We first compared the results and analysed the types of actors behind the 
development of COVID-19 apps based on the developer listed for the app 4 and in-
formation on the app details page, and second compared what type of responses 
they offer to the pandemic by examining available information in the app stores, 
including developer name, developer identifier, app descriptions, app icons, app 
screenshots, and developer websites. In both cases, apps can belong to multiple 
categories as they may offer various response types and may be developed in col-
laboration between different actors. Third, we examined app development respon-
3. Google’s mobile platform Android has a 71.18% market share worldwide, followed by Apple’s iOS 
with 28.19% (Statcounter, 2021). As a consequence of the platform companies tightly connecting 
their app stores to their mobile operating systems, Google’s Play store (except in China) and Apple’s 
App Store have become the key distribution channels of apps worldwide. 
4. For the purposes of this article, we interpret the ‘developer name’ listed on the app store details 
page as the actor responsible for the development of that app. However, the actor listed as the ‘de-
veloper’ on the app details page is not necessarily, or not always, the same as the developer of that 
app (e.g. when the ‘developer’ merely listed the app in the app store, without having developed it). 
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sivity across countries by retrieving all app version updates to account for the re-
lease dynamics in pandemic crisis responses. This responsiveness is enabled by 
the generative conditions provided by platforms that enable unprompted innova-
tion (Zittrain, 2008), but stresses the capacity of developers, rather than of plat-
forms, to respond quickly in the face of the uncertainties of the pandemic. Fourth, 
we conducted a content analysis of the app descriptions to examine how develop-
ers rhetorically position their apps in terms of techniques used, and how they en-
gage with data and privacy issues. Finally, we examined the building blocks devel-
opers use in their app software packages to build COVID-19 apps. Due to the strict 
technical governance of iOS apps by Apple, we focused on the embedded software 
development kits (SDKs, i.e., collections of software libraries and tools commonly 
used by app developers) in Android apps. We used the AppBrain API to retrieve the 
embedded SDKs. 5 We collected all the data in mid-2020 when most countries al-
ready had one or more apps listed in the app stores. Google Play data were col-
lected on 29 June (editorial subset) and on 16 July (non-editorial subset); Apple’s 
App Store data were collected on 20 July. Versions were retrospectively retrieved 
from App Annie. 
In the initial phase of demarcating our data sets, we noticed that both stores have 
distinct logics and mechanisms for surfacing, organising, and ranking apps. We 
queried the 150 supported Google Play ‘countries’ and the 140 supported App 
Store ‘countries and regions’ for [COVID], [COVID-19], [corona], and related key-
words using custom-built app store scrapers. 6 Apple's App Store returned ranked 
lists of 100 apps per country for our search queries, resulting in a total source set 
of 248 unique iOS apps. Google Play, however, did not produce such ranked lists. 
Instead, it rerouted all COVID-19 queries to a relatively small set of pre-selected 
apps in each local store. 
Typically, app stores are organised through an algorithmic logic of sorting and 
ranking, complemented with an editorial logic of ‘best of’ and ‘editor’s choice’ lists 
(Dieter et al., 2019; Gillespie, 2014). For COVID-19-related search queries, Google 
Play solely relies on an editorial strategy (i.e., a search query filter) to surface a 
highly curated set of COVID-19 apps per country. A user searching for 
COVID-19-related terms is automatically redirected to Google’s editorially curated 
list of COVID-19 apps, and specifically those of the user’s home location only. We 
found that we could easily circumvent this editorial filter by exposing it to simple 
5. AppBrain API specification, https://www.appbrain.com/info/help/api/specification.html 
6. The app store scrapers have been developed by the App Studies and Digital Methods Initiatives and 
are available at: http://appstudies.org/tools/. 
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misspellings (e.g., [COVIID], [coronna], etc.), after which Google Play returned a 
more extensive list of relevant apps. Consequently, we captured two complemen-
tary source sets for Google Play: (a) an ‘editorial’ set of app responses per country 
with 247 unique apps, and (b) a ‘non-editorial’ set of 163 additional apps through 
misspellings. These 163 ‘additional’ apps were present in Google Play, but Google 
Play's editorial filter prevents these apps from surfacing for standard [COVID-19] 
search queries. In addition, there are also apps that are not included in our data 
set (e.g., the German luca response app) because they do not mention ‘coronavirus’, 
‘COVID-19’, ‘pandemic’, or related keywords (Google Help, 2020b), despite being 
part of the pandemic response. While this is a limitation to our method, it also at-
tests to the governance of this app ecosystem through controlling the terms used 
on app details pages (as only apps from recognised sources are eligible to use 
COVID-19-related keywords in their titles or descriptions). 
The global ecosystem of pandemic response apps 
In what follows, we present results from our analysis of the [COVID-19]-related 
app ecosystems of Google Play (Android) and App Store (iOS). 
Source sets and actor types identified 
We first compared the app distribution in our data sets and the different actors in-
volved in their production. Figure 1 shows the distribution of COVID-19 apps 
across both stores and further distinguishes between the editorial and non-editori-
al Google Play apps. Individual apps are colour-coded to represent actor types: 
government, civil society, health authority, academic, and private actors. 
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FIGURE 1: Demarcated source sets (Google Play and App Store). Light green: Android app 
ecosystem (Google Play source set); light blue: iOS app ecosystem (App Store source set). 
Illustration: authors and DensityDesign Lab. 
The most striking finding is the large number of apps that feature in only one 
store. While the apps shared across stores (N=136) tend to be made by government 
actors, many government-made apps are only available in one store. About 70% 
(N=134) of government apps within the Google Play editorial set do not have an 
iOS equivalent in the App Store. While more fine-grained analysis is needed to un-
derstand these differences, one likely factor is the different market shares of the 
respective mobile operating systems and app stores across countries. To illustrate, 
Android has a 95% market dominance in India (Statcounter, 2021), and this country 
produced the highest number of Android COVID-19 apps overall, as we detail be-
low. Another contributing factor is Android’s more permissive (open) architecture, 
as compared to Apple’s restrictive (closed) iOS architecture style and governance 
(Eaton et al., 2011); specifically, the more permissive use of sensors on Android de-
vices, which are key to developing contact-tracing applications. The variance sug-
gests divergent national strategies for implementing apps across platforms, which 
has consequences for users who may be presented with a different selection of 
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COVID-19 apps based on their mobile operating system and corresponding app 
store. 
There are also notable differences in the composition of actors developing 
COVID-19-related apps in each store (Figure 2). Government-produced apps are the 
most prevalent in both stores, positioning governments as key official and recog-
nised sources outlined in the app stores’ policies. However, they are significantly 
more prevalent in Google Play (65%, N=267), and even more so in the Google Play 
editorial set (79%, N=195), compared to the App Store (48%, N=121). One outcome 
of Google’s editorial strategy is an increased presence and visibility of these gov-
ernment-made apps, yet curiously 42% of Google Play’s government-made apps 
did not make it into the editorial source set, indicating that being a government 
actor alone is not enough to make the editorial list. 
In contrast, private actor apps are relatively more prevalent in the App Store (41%) 
than Google Play (32%). The privately-developed iOS apps are predominantly from 
commercial actors offering healthcare solutions. While most also exist as Android 
apps, they do not surface in our Google Play data sets, signalling how Google and 
Apple have different criteria for retrieving health companies and organisations as 
official and recognised sources. Additionally, the COVID-19 app response condi-
tions gave rise to governmental actors seeking app development collaborations 
with private actors for Android (N=26) and iOS (N=12) apps. These collaborations 
were often explicitly mentioned in the app description. Further, a small but signifi-
cant number of apps have been developed with the involvement of academic re-
searchers (e.g., Covid Symptom Study); civil society actors (e.g., Stopp Corona from 
the Austrian Red Cross, or the WHO apps); or health authorities (e.g., the French 
Covidom Patient to monitor COVID-19 patients after a hospital visit). While lesser in 
number, the presence of these other actor types contributes to the credibility and 
legitimacy of the apps and the ecosystem at large. 
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FIGURE 2: Actor types identified behind [COVID-19]-related apps (Android and iOS), based on the 
listed developer names and app descriptions. Note: apps can belong to multiple categories. 
Illustration: authors. 
Geographical distribution of apps by country 
After exploring the distribution of apps and actor types across platforms, we fo-
cused on their geographical distribution. The App Store’s ranked lists of apps are 
less country-specific and show a high overlap between countries and regions. 
Google Play, whose editorial filter surfaces only country-specific COVID-19 apps, 
allows for a more distinctive geographic image (Figure 3). In this store, we find 
that most countries offer a small selection of country-specific apps, coupled with 
two WHO apps (OpenWHO: Knowledge for Health Emergencies and WHO Info). As 
early as 15 February, a month before the pandemic was officially declared, the 
WHO stated that ‘we’re not just fighting an epidemic; we’re fighting an infodemic’ 
(Zarocostas, 2020, p. 676). To combat COVID-19 dis/misinformation, the WHO had 
begun working closely with more than 50 major platform companies, including 
Google, to implement solutions to fight the emerging infodemic (WHO, 2020b). 
This collaboration, initiated by the WHO, resulted in ensuring that ‘science-based 
health messages from the organisation or other official sources appear first when 
people search for information related to COVID-19’ on participating platforms 
(WHO, 2020b, n.p.), as we observe in Google Play with the surfacing of the WHO 
apps. 
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FIGURE 3: Geographical distribution of [COVID-19]-related Android apps by country or region. 
Illustration: authors and DensityDesign Lab. 
Measured in terms of downloads, most countries have a primary app within the 
country-specific apps by a government actor. There are, however, notable excep-
tions. While India has one dominant government-provided app (Aarogya Setu), 
which was made mandatory for government and private sector employees during 
the early stages of the pandemic, India offers 61 apps in total, far more than any 
other country. Upon closer inspection, we found that India had a multi-tiered re-
sponse with many apps developed for specific regions and developed by local gov-
ernments (Bedi and Sinha, 2020). In contrast, countries such as Taiwan, Denmark, 
Iceland, Portugal, and Uruguay offered only one app (in addition to the WHO apps), 
all of which are government-provided. We also see countries where non-govern-
ment apps are dominant or highly prevalent (Philippines, Thailand, Mauritius, 
Netherlands, Canada) or where the dominant app involves multiple actors in their 
production, including collaborations between governmental and private actors 
(Germany, Czechia, Austria, Kyrgyzstan). In some countries, we found multiple apps 
reflecting a regional or state-based app response, strategies with multiple apps 
with distinctive features, or competing (non-governmental) apps and strategies. 
It is worth noting two final observations about geographical distribution. First, 
China is notably missing from our study because it banned Google Play. To battle 
the pandemic, China has relied on Health Code, a mini-programme developed by 
Alipay and WeChat, which generates a colour-based health code for travelling 
(Liang, 2020). Instead of developing new COVID-19 apps, China integrated Health 
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Code into two dominant mobile payment apps. Second, the two WHO apps surface 
for every country, with one notable exception: the United States. Not only did the 
WHO apps not make it to the editorial list, but direct search queries for these apps 
redirected to the US editorial list where the WHO apps did not feature. In April 
2020, President Trump halted funding to the WHO, after criticism of the US’ re-
sponse to the COVID-19 pandemic. A few months later, in July, President Trump 
moved forward to officially withdraw the US membership from the WHO. The 
omission of the two WHO apps in the US may reflect broader geopolitical dynam-
ics and suggests that the editorialisation of Google Play’s app ecosystem may not 
be conducted by Google alone. The editorial lists reflect a generally benevolent 
platform strategy to steer users to what is perceived to be the most appropriate 
apps; however, in this case, we see the editorial logic used for more overtly politi-
cal purposes with the emergence of censorship (even though these WHO apps ex-
ist in the US store). 
Pandemic response types 
To understand the type of responses COVID-19 apps offer, we inquired into what 
kind of apps these actors built. This allows us to identify which response types are 
dominant, and which emerge with the distinct governance mechanisms of each 
store and the actors in each ecosystem. 
While contact-tracing apps have received the most attention in news reporting, we 
found many different response types (Figure 4(a)). In both stores, 50–60% of all 
apps offer news and information on the pandemic, developed by various types of 
actors (Figure 4(b) and (c)). The prominence of authoritative information, updates 
and data may result from the WHO’s collaboration with platform companies to ‘im-
munize the public against misinformation’ by connecting users to official sources 
(WHO, 2020b). 
At the time of the analysis, over 20% of apps engage with contact-tracing and ex-
posure notification, which are typically built by government actors or in collabora-
tion with private actors (Figure 4(b) and (c)). We find a diversity of potential sur-
veillance forms beyond contact-tracing: over 48% of apps offer different kinds of 
symptom checkers or reporting tools, ranging from keeping a diary to the solicita-
tion of medical and personal data. They are connected to private companies, acad-
emic research, or aligned with public healthcare. About 15% of all apps offer tools 
for remote healthcare developed by governmental and private actors. 
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FIGURE 4(A) TO (C): Comparison of response types represented by [COVID-19]-related apps (Google 
Play vs App Store). Note: apps can belong to multiple categories. Illustration: authors. 
We also found new categories compared to existing literature, such as mental 
health apps to deal with psychological pressures during the pandemic. We further 
found apps soliciting data for research studies, such as the German Corona-Daten-
spende, by donating data from various devices for assisting in academic studies on 
COVID-19. When comparing the two stores, we find that networked medicine apps 
(for healthcare workers to communicate and interact within a system) are more 
prevalent in the App Store, while crisis communication, quarantine compliance, 
and informant apps (to report people breaking COVID-19 rules to authorities) are 
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mostly or only available in Google Play. 
Notably, quarantine compliance, informant, movement permit, and crisis communi-
cation apps are primarily built by government actors. We found apps facilitating 
crowd-sourced state surveillance in Argentina, Chile, and Russia. These ‘social 
monitoring’ apps enable reporting on the suspicious behaviour of others. In 
Bangladesh and India, governmental apps call on citizens to report ‘possibly af-
fected people’ to ‘free the country’ as part of their ‘citizen responsibility’. In Lithua-
nia and India, we observed the gamification of a pandemic where users can partici-
pate in daily health monitoring or symptom tracking to collect points to receive re-
wards or discounts. 
Developer responsivity 
To analyse how rapidly the COVID-19 app ecosystem emerged and evolved, we ex-
amined how responsive app developers have been to the pandemic. We use the 
term responsivity as a measure or proxy for the dynamics of software updates dur-
ing the crisis and its openness to unprompted innovation (Zittrain, 2008). Respon-
sivity is defined by how quickly apps are released and is measured by the number 
of app updates per time interval. It captures a sense of how actively a country/de-
veloper is working on those apps and how invested countries are in the response 
that the app represents. 
Figure 5 shows the Android apps per country plotted on a timeline, indicating 
when countries first introduced them in transparent circles and updated them in 
coloured squares. It shows that early app development commenced almost imme-
diately after the official declaration of the pandemic with most countries launch-
ing their apps in March–April 2020. Interestingly, we found that several apps exist-
ed before the crisis started. These are primarily pre-existing e-government apps, 
medical apps for communicating with health professionals and apps providing 
healthcare information. While conforming with the new platform policies of Apple 
and Google that prioritise releases from official and recognised entities, these re-
purposed apps signal the developers’ agile response in using existing apps and 
app functionalities to deal with the crisis. 
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FIGURE 5: Responsivity of [COVID-19]-related app developers by country (Android only), 2013 – 
August 2020. Circles are initial releases (i.e., app launches); squares are any additional releases 
(i.e., app updates); scaled by the total number of releases. Data: App Annie. Illustration: authors and 
DensityDesign Lab. 
Existing research on ‘app evolution’ has found that around 14% of apps are updat-
ed regularly on a bi-weekly basis (McIlroy et al., 2015), while developers abandon 
the vast majority of apps shortly after being released (Tiwana, 2015). By contrast, 
surveying the average pace of updates for the COVID-19 apps per country demon-
strates a high level of responsivity, particularly in India, Brazil, and the United Arab 
Emirates. Zooming into specific examples such as Columbia’s CoronApp (the most 
frequently updated app in our data) reveals how agile development has coordinat-
ed with ongoing government injunctions to handle the pandemic. Inspecting the 
changelogs (‘What’s New’) reveals recurring efforts to synchronise app functionali-
ties with state emergency decrees. 
From an inverse perspective on responsivity, a relative absence of development ac-
tivity can also prompt further research into pandemic governance. Denmark and 
the UK show limited responsivity, which may indicate delays in developing 
COVID-19 apps, including due to public controversies. In June 2020, Denmark’s da-
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ta protection agency prohibited its app from processing personal data until further 
notice (Amnesty International, 2020). The app has since relaunched after address-
ing multiple privacy issues. England and Wales, meanwhile, initially experimented 
with an app that used a centralised approach to data collection, but this was even-
tually abandoned (Sabbagh and Hern, 2020). Thus the findings additionally can re-
flect cases of backlash and legal contestation, specifically related to data protec-
tion and privacy. 
Finally, an essential aspect of pandemic app store governance is the degree to 
which the app stores actively enforce their policies by removing apps. While it is 
difficult to establish whether the developer or the app store removed an app, and 
for what reason, two large scale analyses found that after 1.5–2 years, Google Play 
(Wang et al., 2018) and the App Store (Lin, 2021) removed almost half of the apps 
in their stores. In our data set, Google Play removed only 7.5% (N=31) and the App 
Store only 6.0% (N=15) of all apps after eight months. This is even lower than the 
study by Samhi et al. on COVID-19 apps (2020), which observed that 15% of 
COVID-19-related apps had been removed in the first two weeks after data collec-
tion in June 2020. COVID-19 apps are subject to ‘an increased level of enforcement’ 
during the app review phase and are thus likely more thoroughly screened and re-
moved sooner (Google Help, 2020b). 
Discursive positioning of response apps 
In the next step, we analysed how the apps discursively present themselves to 
users and how they engage with existing technology and data and privacy debates. 
Textual app descriptions address users in particular ways to inform them about the 
apps’ functionalities and use cases, and persuade users to download them. We ex-
amined whether apps explicitly mentioned specific techniques and data/privacy 
concerns in their descriptions, and measured their keyword frequency. The tech-
niques listed in Figure 6(a) and (b) indicate how developers convey different 
COVID-19 app responses to users. It includes prominent terms like location, notifi-
cation, track/trace, alongside implementation terms like GPS, Bluetooth, alert, 
smart, or platform, and even mentions of machine-learning algorithms and artifi-
cial intelligence to identify COVID-19 symptoms. We also found related terms such 
as video, chat, messaging, and bots – often used in relation to remote healthcare 
and diagnosis. Overall, the distribution of these terms is similar in both app 
ecosystems, suggesting a similar discourse around techniques is used. 
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FIGURE 6(A) AND (B): Resonance of technique-related terms used in [COVID-19]-related app titles 
and/or descriptions (Android and iOS). Illustration: authors. 
Next, we identified the presence of terms related to data/privacy solutions or con-
cerns. Figures 8(a) and (b) show relatively high use of terms describing how apps 
deal with collected data, including anonymous, encrypted, sensitive, or locally 
stored data. We also find occasional claims that apps delete data, securely transmit 
data via HTTPS, or process data adhering to the EU General Data Protection Regu-
lation (mostly European apps). As such, these apps express their compliance with 
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the app stores’ policies, which have additional requirements for collecting and us-
ing personal or sensitive data to support COVID-19-related (research) efforts (Ap-
ple Developer, 2020b; Google Help, 2020b). Overall, we observe that the app re-
sponse to the pandemic is primarily framed as a data/privacy-sensitive one. Half of 
iOS app descriptions (N=126) and 40% of Android apps (N=158) mention data/pri-
vacy terms, showing how app developers address their users’ potential privacy 
concerns. It bears emphasizing, of course, that the mere presence of these dis-
courses does not mean the operations of these apps conform to such stated capac-
ities and values (Kuntsman, Miyake and Martin, 2019). 
FIGURE 7(A) AND (B): Resonance of data/privacy-related terms used in [COVID-19]-related app 
titles and/or descriptions (Android and iOS). Illustration: authors. 
Development of response apps 
Finally, we inquired into the development of apps from a technical perspective, 
drawing attention to software development kits (SDKs) as the building blocks for 
mobile app development, enabling developers to implement particular frameworks 
and external functionalities. In this context, Google and Apple are essential play-
ers with their app stores as means of distribution, and their central role as infra-
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structure providers offering and controlling the means of production. They func-
tion as an ‘obligatory passage point’ for the production and distribution of apps in 
which their SDKs function as mechanisms of generativity and control, enabling 
platforms to govern the development of apps (Blanke and Pybus, 2020; Pybus and 
Coté, 2021; Tilson et al., 2012). This analysis, however, only focuses on Android 
apps due to Apple’s very restrictive technical governance of iOS apps. 
For our 410 Android apps, we find 7,335 SDKs in total, with an average of 19 SDKs 
per app (28 apps returned no data from AppBrain). 79 apps contain no libraries at 
all, suggesting that they have not been built with standard development tools 
such as Android Studio and may have been coded from scratch, or perhaps that de-
velopers are cautious about implementing third-party code in this ecosystem. 
Among these are apps from the Indian, Nepalese, and Vietnamese government. 
The high average number of SDKs shows developers’ reliance on these libraries for 
building apps and for accessing (third-party) functionality. Figure 8 shows that the 
majority of the embedded SDKs are development tools (98.4%, N=7,217), followed 
by advertising network libraries (1.06%, N=78) and social libraries (0.54%, N=40). 
The main development tools are embedding user interface components, network-
ing, app development frameworks, Java utilities, databases, and analytics. We find 
very few advertising libraries due to Google’s policy restrictions on COVID-19 app 
monetisation. Interestingly, we found most of them in apps built by governments. 
For example, we detected Google’s AdMob SDK in government-made apps from In-
dia, Qatar, and Singapore, and the Outbrain SDK in government-made apps from 
Australia, Argentina, Italy, and the United Arab Emirates. 
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FIGURE 8: Software libraries embedded in [COVID-19]-related apps (Android only). Nodes are 
library tags (left), library types, their developers or owners, and their open-source availability 
(right); scaled by the number of occurrences. Highlighted are libraries developed/owned by Google 
(dark green). Illustration: authors and DensityDesign Lab. 
When looking at the developers behind the SDKs, we find 134 unique actors. We 
observe a strong dependency on Google as 56% of all apps rely on at least one 
Google-owned SDK, and a single app relies on 11 Google-owned SDKs on average 
(Figure 9). We further find 70 individual developers, most of them on GitHub, offer-
ing specific solutions such as data serialisation, data conversion and image crop-
ping. 81% of all apps use one or more open source libraries with an average app 
using 15 open source SDKs. We find that Google dominates the means of produc-
tion by owning the most libraries; not just the ‘core’ Android ones, but also those 
used to embed maps and app analytics. By focusing on the ownership of these li-
21 Dieter et al.
braries, we highlight the material conditions of platforms and apps like Google as 
‘service assemblages’ (Blanke and Pybus, 2020) which reveals some of the deeper 
ways in which pandemic platform governance, and platform power more generally, 
manifests. 
FIGURE 9: Developers behind software libraries embedded in [COVID-19]-related apps by country 
or region (Android only). Circles (pies) are library developer distributions per country; horizontal 
axis: continents; vertical axis: % of open source libraries. Illustration: authors and DensityDesign 
Lab. 
Conclusion: Governing the pandemic response 
A key starting point for our analysis of COVID-19 apps was to go beyond the criti-
cal analysis of single apps within a national context. As we have shown, COVID-19 
apps also need to be understood relationally, situated within infrastructures and 
embedded in the context of platform governance. Such an understanding recognis-
es from the beginning that platform companies occupy a central role in app 
ecosystems, exercised through diverse mechanisms and agencies that operate 
across different layers (Gorwa, 2019), and mediated by the relationships between 
governments, citizens and other actors. 
In this article, we demonstrated and discussed how the two dominant COVID-19 
app ecosystems have taken shape during the pandemic through acts of exception-
al platform governance. We observed unique techniques of control determining 
which apps make it into the stores, how they are positioned and accessed in the 
stores, who they are developed by, and what kinds of functionality they may have 
(including restrictions on ads and other economic features). Nevertheless, the plat-
forms’ technical affordances have provided generative means for a diversity of re-
sponses to emerge, with individual apps negotiating these governing conditions as 
part of their development. 
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First, we observed a broad alignment of states, international organisations and 
platform companies in terms of the recognised need to act or get ‘involved in the 
fight’. While tensions have come to predominantly define the relations between 
platform companies and national governments in terms of competition, privacy, 
taxation or content moderation (e.g. Busch et al., 2021; Gorwa, 2019; Khan, 2018; 
Klonick, 2017; Suzor, 2018), the pandemic re-directs these powerful actors around 
a global threat in specific ways. This includes the related infodemic and the need 
to maintain the perception of legitimate authority during the roll-out of apps 
whose data-gathering powers may otherwise face strong resistance. While such 
tensions may obviously remain, yet they are thrown into relief by the context of 
the crisis (as the omission of the WHO apps in the US demonstrate), which allows 
for a unique empirical mapping of the asymmetries, power relations and points of 
potential negotiation that shape platform governance more generally. 
Secondly, pandemic platform governance has initially supported the production of 
app ecosystems which are partially ‘sandboxed’ from the economic activity that 
typically constitutes platform scenarios. Although COVID-19 apps without a doubt 
further entrench the economic dominance of platforms overall, during this early 
period we observe a heightening of their role as ‘regulatory intermediators’ within 
this specific niche by connecting citizens with government services and other au-
thorities (Busch, 2020). In the case of Google, for instance, this intermediation is 
heavily steered through specialised modes of editorialisation. How this role 
changes over time, however, should remain subject to ongoing critical observation. 
Third, this repurposing of platform infrastructures for ostensibly public ends signif-
icantly intensifies the intermediation of platform companies and governments. 
Platform companies increasingly act as a quasi-critical global infrastructure (yet 
with limited public oversight); organising and managing the emerging app ecosys-
tem across national contexts while also providing the means of distribution 
(stores) and production (with SDKs, but also in the case of the GAEN protocols). For 
their part, national governments are cast in the role of complementors, developing 
apps under the regulatory conditions of the platform companies, often in partner-
ship with other actors. How governments act in this novel role varies significantly 
in terms of the apps they develop (app responses), their partnerships (actor types), 
and ongoing activity (responsivity). 
Fourth, several aspects of the COVID-19 app ecosystem help legitimise the produc-
tion and distribution of apps to respond to the pandemic. Within the apps’ descrip-
tions, we detect discourses around specific digital technologies, data and privacy; 
with apps signalling their technical competence, awareness of data protection is-
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sues and data policies. Whether the apps actually abide by these stated claims is 
another question, yet it is telling that both solutionist and privacy protection dis-
courses are mobilised within this niche for purposes of persuasion and reassur-
ance. How these kinds of discourses might contribute to further blurring distinc-
tions between figures of the user and citizen is a point for further inquiry. 
Finally, within the context of the pandemic, mobile app platforms have facilitated 
heterogenous configurations of governance, while still systematically shaping the 
activities of complementors. That is, despite the tightening of platform control un-
der pandemic conditions, there exists a wide diversity of pandemic apps responses 
that can raise different issues within distinct spheres of sovereign governance and 
authority. Thus, with platform companies acting as facilitators, we see a diverse 
range of national strategies, exceptions and outliers. While the operations of pan-
demic platform governance are global in scale, it can nevertheless produce scenar-
ios where Argentinian citizens are snitching on each other through informant apps, 
United Kingdom citizens participate in academic symptom studies, and US citizens 
are uniquely denied access to the WHO information apps. 
Pandemic platform governance, therefore, foregrounds how platforms have adopt-
ed and negotiated their new role as a marketplace serving commercial interests in 
ordinary times and additional public interests in exceptional circumstances. While 
precedents for this role exist in e-government and e-health apps and services, the 
pandemic has accelerated and intensified these dynamics. By mapping the ecosys-
tems of available COVID-19 apps, therefore, we learn how mobile platforms have 
responded to the global pandemic and infodemic with additional extraordinary 
measures to demarcate public interest niches from the wider commercial environ-
ment of the app store. The question for policymakers and citizens is how this new 
governance might continue to evolve in future now that platforms have come to 
play a key role in mediating public values and global governmental responses to 
the pandemic. 
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